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Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia presented 
the landmine and UXO problem of the 
South Caucasus.  Many workshops such 
as this one are full of some successes and 
many failures.  The key is to keep push-
ing the workshops because success is being 
achieved, even if change is gradual.
Some consensus was observed on the 
desirability for all countries in the region to 
work toward becoming States Parties to the 
Ottawa Convention once peace agreements 
to regional conflicts are reached. Georgia 
and Azerbaijan have already made positive 
steps by announcing a moratorium on the 
use, production and transfer of anti-person-
nel landmines. The main obstacle for acces-
sion to the Convention is dealing with ter-
ritory not controlled by national authorities. 
In the South Caucasus there are unresolved 
conflicts in the OSCE areas, including con-
flicts in Georgia (South Osetia and Abhazija) 
and Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabah).  
A suggestion to include mine-action ac-
tivities on the agenda of peace negotiations 
within the OSCE Minsk Group7 was widely 
supported, as well as the option to meet 
jointly in Georgia’s offices with Georgia 
acting as a mediator between Armenia and 
Azerbaijan.
In the second part of the workshop, the 
representatives from three central Asian 
countries (Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and 
Kazakhstan) presented the mine problems 
in their countries. Common problems are 
mines that lie on state borders, especially on 
the border with Uzbekistan. Only Tajikistan 
has joined the Ottawa Convention, possibly 
serving as a role model for other countries 
in the region. Largely because of its status 
as a State Party to the Ottawa Convention, 
Tajikistan’s mine-action program receives 
financial support from several donor coun-
tries. All three delegations from central Asia 
supported the idea of developing a follow-up 
regional workshop in the near future. 
The Tbilisi workshop ended with a 
roundtable discussion in which participants 
discussed possible next steps in mine action. 
The following cooperation was suggested:
• Continuation of joint training
• Cooperation in mine-victim assistance
• Encouragement to announce a mora-
torium on the use of anti-person-
nel mines and to voluntarily submit 
reports on each country’s respective 
landmine situation in accordance with 
Article 7 of the Ottawa Convention
• Marking of all known minefields
• Including the mine problem in ne-
gotiations within the OSCE Minsk 
Group 
• Developing a follow-up workshop in 
Central Asia in the near future. 
Conclusion
Cooperation in mine action among 
countries is one of the first steps for confi-
dence building in the region, as experience 
from southeastern Europe shows. 
A simple conclusion can be drawn from 
the Tbilisi workshop: Demining is consid-
ered a complementary activity of the OSCE, 
not a central one. However, since demin-
ing makes way for the core activities of the 
OSCE—primarily disarmament, human 
rights and environmental issues—to be 
truly exercised, participation in mine-action 
activities is essential for OSCE. 
See Endnotes, Page
On the basis of one of conclusion of the 
Tbilisi workshop, Canada and Slovenia, sup-
ported by Kazakhstan, prepared a follow-up 
workshop for central Asia in the framework 
of the OSCE. The workshop was held 26–27 
March 2007 in Kazakhstan, but specifics were 
not available at the time of this writing.
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In spite of the fact that 60 years have already passed since the biggest and the most severe war of the 20th century, the problem of clearing a large number of unexploded ordnance from Ukrainian territories 
is still topical. Engineering and demining units from the Ministry 
of Defense completed partial clearance of the territories in Ukraine 
in the mid-1970s. Despite the considerable work the deminers have 
done and are still doing on extraction, neutralization and destruction 
of the detected World War II unexploded objects, there are still ac-
cidents resulting in injuries to and deaths of the civilian population. 
Nowadays, the government of Ukraine is improving the procedures 
of mine action in accordance with the requirements of International 
Mine Action Standards and plans to set up a specialized governmen-
tal body for coordinating all mine action in the country. 
Clearing unexploded objects from Ukraine’s territories is 
the obligation of the Ministries of Emergency and of Defense. 
Ukroboronservice State Company (through its structural subunit, the 
Center of Humanitarian Demining) specializes in carrying out com-
mercial projects in Ukraine and abroad. This company has played the 
leading role in establishing humanitarian demining in Ukraine. 
The area most contaminated by unexploded objects is the Crimea 
Peninsula, namely the towns Sevastopol and Kerch, where 30 people 
have perished or been injured due to WWII unexploded objects in 
recent years. In January 2001 the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine 
adopted a state program—“Clearance of WWII Unexploded Objects 
in the Area of Towns of Sevasopol and Kerch until 2010”—based 
on the results of investigations the specialists of Ukroboronservice 
State Company had done. This program will run until the end of 
December 2010.
The Inkerman Adits Ammunition Depot
The main area that needs to be cleared of explosives within the 
framework of this program is the destroyed Inkerman Adits located 
two kilometers (1.3 miles) from Sevastopol. The Inkerman Adits were 
destroyed due to an ammunition explosion in June 1942. Before the 
explosion, they served as the Soviet Army ammunition depot, storing 
more than 10,000 metric tons (11,023 U.S. tons) of ordnance. 
A considerable amount of ammunition (approximately 1,000 to 
3,000 metric tons [1,102 to 3,307 U.S. tons]) did not detonate dur-
ing that explosion and until now access to it has been obstructed. The 
intact areas of the galleries2 are practically inaccessible. The majority 
of the ammunition that did not detonate has been mechanically and 
thermally damaged as well as affected by weather, such as erosion and 
the periodic influence of ground heave.
Examination of the destroyed adits has shown that the rock massif 
over them consists of separate blocks (more than 1,000 cubic me-
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ters or 35,315 cubic feet) and is separated by a consid-
erable number of vertical and inclined splits. The adits 
themselves are mainly covered with rock fragments, but 
there are also some preserved areas. Access to the adits is 
quite difficult but possible through the cracks and gaps 
between the rock fragments. Teenagers and adults (so-
called “black diggers”) used such means to quarry the 
metals and explosives (TNT and powders) in order to 
sell the remains of metal or TNT for money.
Today a key danger of the adits is that the houses, 
railway station, motorways, bridges and industrial infra-
structure of Sevastopol and Inkerman within a three-
kilometer (two-mile) range may be destroyed if the 
remaining ammunition explodes. The reasons for such 
an explosion could be seismic activity, the black diggers’ 
actions or chemical reactions that can occur in the dam-
aged ammunition during long-term storage. Several op-
tions for solving this problem include the following:
• Prohibiting access to the objects by guarding them
• Filling up the adits with bulk material or concrete
• Extracting and neutralizing unexploded objects 
on specially designated ranges
The first two options cannot completely solve the 
problem, and the expenses are approximately equal to 
the third option. Thus, it was decided to clear the adits 
of unexploded objects. At the same time, the question 
of whether to use horizontal or vertical excavations to 
access the underground was raised. Vertical access was 
more acceptable technologically and financially and was 
given preference. 
The Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine have set up 
an interdepartmental working group, with repre-
sentatives from Ukraine’s Ministries of Emergency, 
Economy, Finance, Industrial Policy and Defense to coordinate program activi-
ties. Project financing is provided by Ukraine. The main executor of the work 
is Ukroboronservice State Company. The specialists of Ukroboronservice con-
ducting the clearance task proposed a problem-solving strategy comprising several 
stages:
1. Thorough investigation
2. Ensuring access to unexploded ordnance
3. Localization
4. Maximum clearance
Thorough investigation. The first stage took place from 2002 to 2004. During 
this time the working group hired a special group of guards to prevent unau-
thorized persons from accessing the adits. The working group cleared unexploded 
ordnance from the ground surface up to 0.25 centimeter (0.1 inch) in depth and 
determined a scheme of probable adit locations before the explosion. A special-
ized Crimean team conducted speleological investigations while a local institute 
made inspections using such technologies as impulse electromagnetic reconnais-
sance. Ukroboronservice conducted engineering and technical investigations. The 
lack of reliable information regarding the adits’ layout and stockpiled ammuni-
tion before the explosion has caused problems for specialists at the Centre for 
Humanitarian Demining.
According to the results of this stage, Ukroboronservice has determined the 
location of most of the unexploded ordnance, their nomenclature, approximate 
quantity, condition and the possibility of accessing them. Ukroboronservice de-
cided the following:
• To make five vertical excavations (with areas no less than five square me-
ters [54 square feet] deep, 25–35 meters [82–115 feet] each); to reinforce 
the walls of passages with concrete braces no less than 30 centimeters (12 
inches) in width to prevent soil dislocation
• To move the ammunition and in case of an emergency evacuation make up to 
100 running meters (329 feet) of underground horizontal passage, which can 
provide access to explosives in the places where they are most concentrated 
• To reinforce the overhang layer with wooden or concrete supports and pro-
tective constructions to prevent collapse
• To destroy on a special range all ammunition allowed to be transported 
• To preserve the ammunition that cannot be transported by pouring con-
crete in special places under the ground.
During this stage the state company Ukroboronservice provided its expertise, 
collaborating with the private company ATIK. Project completion is expected be-
fore the end of 2010.
Ensuring access to unexploded ordnance. From 2004 to 2006 Ukroboronservice 
and ATIK carried out the second stage. During this stage, Ukroboronservice did 
the main preparations to start the extraction of unexploded objects. Also, ATIK 
made three vertical shafts (25–30 meters [82–99 feet]) and horizontal offshoots 
(30 meters [99 feet]) towards the place where the objects were concentrated. The 
engineer of safety monitored this step, ensuring that deminers cautiously trans-
ported the UXO by hand and machines safely destroyed the ordnance. ATIK 
constructed additional concrete supports to protect against landslides.
Taking into account all safety regula-
tions, teams executed the task of demin-
ing at an intensive and dangerous rhythm. 
Speleologists and deminers worked out a 
special system that considerably increased 
efficiency and safety. To reduce risk, the de-
miners of Ukroboronservice State Company 
constantly made engineering and techni-
cal inspections during the construction of 
vertical and horizontal excavations. Teams 
made wide use of mine-detector Vallon EL 
1303D with the Vallon EVA2000 Module 
Bore Hole and Surface software. With its 
help deminers detected large-caliber aerial 
bombs and were able to confirm and refute 
information concerning the ammunition’s 
main location. While accompanying adit ex-
cavations during this stage, deminers detected 
and destroyed more than 2,000 unexploded 
objects, including shells, mortar mines, aerial 
bombs and the different types of blasters.
One of the difficulties of adit excavation 
is the fact that the rock and soil are con-
stantly in motion. In time new holes and 
cracks appear that give access to the under-
ground section. To control ground move-
ment a Crimean team of specialists conducts 
constant speleological investigations of the 
working site. Based on the results, the safety 
engineer takes the appropriate measures to 
ensure the staff is protected against a pos-
sible landslide. 
Localization. A group of deminers from 
Ukroboronservice have been executing the 
third stage since mid-2006. The third stage 
marked the start of intensive extraction of 
unexploded objects from underground ob-
structions. During detonation of the ord-
nance concentration of a 20 metric tons (22 
U.S. tons) of TNT equivalent, a camouflet3 
explosion may happen and during larger 
ones, a blowout.4 That is why the working 
group believes that reducing the scale of 
possible accidental explosions is important. 
Deminers must create safety lanes, dividing 
excessively mine-laden areas into smaller, 
more manageable quantities of UXO.
During this stage (which at the time of 
writing was still ongoing), the teams have ex-
tracted more than 20,000 pieces of ordnance. 
This total includes munitions of varying 
types and calibers: aerial bombs from 10 to 
1,000 kilograms (22 to 2200 pounds), shells 
from 37 to 180 millimeters and mortar mines 
from 50 to 122 millimeters. Also during this 
stage Ukroboronservice has prohibited unau-
thorized access of the “black diggers.”
Maximum clearance. The working group 
will execute the fourth stage from 2007 to 
2010. Ukroboronservice plans to construct 
two more vertical shafts in order to extract 
a maximum quantity of UXO. Paying atten-
tion to safety regulations, the working group 
will implement a system of actions:
• Collaborating with state services 
such as labor protection, ecology, fire 
safety, etc.
• Constantly monitoring the rocks, 
supporting the walls of passageways 
with concrete and inspecting equip-
ment condition
• Controlling the ammunition's condi-
tion, defining the level of damage and 
handling it carefully
• Communicating reliably between cave-
going teams and surface-level teams 
• Doubling exits in vertical shafts to 
provide easier evacuation for cave-go-
ing teams 
• Prompt first aid to victims and evacu-
ation to the medical center in ac-
cordance with International Mine 
Action Standards5
Conclusion
Besides the Inkerman Adits, the state 
clearance program of unexploded objects 
from Sevastopol and Kerch also takes place in 
six areas: the Makenzy Mountains, near the 
Pyanzin battery, the villages of Geroiyvske 
and Bondarenkove, Adzhimushkay quar-
ries and the Black Sea. Ukroboronservice 
believes that carrying out this program will 
help eliminate many dangerous explosive 
remnants of WWII. 
Ukroboronservice’s four stage plan for 
clearance of the Inkerman Adits requires 
prompt and complete financing from the 
state; however, Ukraine has only paid half of 
the total amount necessary to complete the 
task. Incomplete program financing will ad-
versely impact the time it takes to complete 
the work. With every passing year the clear-
ance of the Inkerman Adits becomes increas-
ingly more expensive. Insufficient financing 
forces individuals involved with the project to 
increase their working hours while the threat 
of an accidental explosion escalates. 
See Endnotes, Page
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This room, eight meters (26 feet) in height, contains fragments 
of supporting walls.
During Stage One, shaft-sinking and tunneling provide underground access. After this step has been 
completed, stepladders are replaced by special loading equipment.
A speleologist inspects an exploded area in order to determine 
rock condition and its displacement.
Deminers conduct tests to discover UXO under the floor (left) and extract UXO from stone fragments (right).
Thirty-five meters (115 feet) from the surface, a 
deminer surveys an exploded area of the adits, which 
contains aerial bombs weighing 1,000 kilograms 
(2,205 pounds), artillery shells, ammunition remains, 
wooden boxes and rock fragments.
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